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Abstract 
We present a brief review of modern machine learning techniques and their use in 
models of human mental representations, detailing three notable branches: spatial 
methods, logical methods and artificial neural networks. Each of these branches 
contain an extensive set of systems, and demonstrate accurate emulations of human 
learning of categories, concepts and language, despite substantial differences in 
operation. We suggest that continued applications will allow cognitive researchers the 
ability to model the complex real-world problems where machine learning has recently 
been successful, providing more complete behavioural descriptions. This will however 
also require careful consideration of appropriate algorithmic constraints alongside these 
methods in order to find a combination which captures both the strengths and 
weaknesses of human cognition.  
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Introduction 
A common question in the field of cognitive science: how does one go about 
organising all the many items and experiences encountered in everyday life into a 
form which is both usable and useful? Despite the extensive variety of real world 
events, people display a remarkable ability to acquire complex representational forms 
such as item taxonomies, latent patterns and causal structures simply through 
experience. Many theorists have therefore sought insight into this process using 
machine learning techniques, drawing on an extensive set of computational methods 
by which such structures could be generated in artificial agents. The nature and form 
of these methods, however, can vary wildly, leading to substantial differences in the 
generated representation, and so a wide range of behavioural predictions. 
In this paper, we present a brief review of a number of these methods, considering 
differences in form and operation, applications to real-world phenomena, and 
variations in complexity. As machine learning processes encompass a wide range of 
systems and methodologies, providing more potential methods than can be adequately 
summarised within the scope of this paper, we here focus on three key branches of 
these systems: spatial methods, logical methods and artificial neural networks, 
detailing the more prominent methods within these branches in ascending complexity. 
While we attempt to provide brief summaries of these methods, we refer the reader to 
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papers within each branch that provide greater detail on specific methods for further 
reading. This review primarily focuses on applications to human categorisation due to 
the extensive investigation of mental representations in this area, though we also 
present applications to other tasks where appropriate. 
Spatial Methods 
We define spatial methods as mechanisms which directly organise actual items 
and experiences, often placing these items in a multidimensional representational 
space. One simple form this method can take is to store all experienced items in a 
representational space with a similarity gradient around each for use in future 
prediction or classification. This is exemplified in recent kernel methods, which use a 
variety of similarity metrics and often remove redundant stored items to provide a 
more efficient representation [1]; for example, support vector machines use kernel 
functions to draw decision boundaries between categories [2], often resulting in 
highly accurate classification performance [3–5]. 
Such methods are mirrored in behavioural models by exemplar representations, 
which similarly store all items in a multidimensional feature space, using assessments 
of similarity to these stored items when making new predictions [1,6]. These models 
are therefore commonly used as a simple representation of item memory (e.g. [7,8]), 
as well as a base for more complex learning models (e.g. ALCOVE [9]), though 
concerns have been raised regarding the psychological plausibility of exemplar 
representations [10]. 
Beyond this direct representation of items, spatial methods can also produce a 
variety of more abstract representations, with some of the more simplistic being those 
that aggregate sets of items into collected averages, such as k-means clustering and 
self-organised maps [11,12]. These methods correspond with the use of prototypes in 
human learning, often contrasted with exemplar formats, which also use aggregates to 
represent a set, though this usually involves only a singular average [13], matching 
with the most basic form of these methods. Prototypes provide an intuitive method of 
summarising data sets into an easy-to-use form, but in doing so can miss more 
complex aspects of item representation, including the relations between stimuli 
(including the exclusive-or problem illustrated in Figure 1) [10,14], suggesting 
greater complexity is in fact required. 
A more flexible representation is provided by clustering methods, in which items 
within a set are assigned to subgroups called clusters according to observed 
similarities. While this can involve a fixed number of clusters as in the above k-
means, much machine learning research has investigated non-parametric forms of this 
representation, in which the number of clusters is flexible and learned from the data. 
The Dirichlet Process Mixture Model is one of the most notable non-parametric 
clustering methods, in which cluster assignments are made sequentially according to 
the existing number of cluster members [15]. More recently, the Indian Buffet 
Process prior has been used in similar systems to provide alternative representations 
in which cluster assignments are replaced with feature inferences, being potentially 
infinite in number [16]. 
In cognitive science, these processes have been most commonly used within 
Bayesian models of cognition, providing a non-parametric probabilistic system which 
infers external structures according to both direct observation and prior beliefs [17,18]. 
These clustering models essentially offer an interpolation between the above exemplar 
and prototype forms, with each cluster acting as a distinct prototype; any created 
partition therefore falls between these two extremes depending on the number of 
clusters formed. This is most evident in rational models of categorisation [17], though 
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similar techniques have been applied to numerosity [19,20], language segmentation 
[21] and causal inference [22]. 
 Recent advancements in these clustering methods have led to increasingly 
complex representations, including hierarchical systems where clusters can be nested 
within each other [23], and the CrossCat model, where multiple partitions of the same 
items can be formed from different feature patterns [24]. This has led to the 
development of hierarchical models of human categorisation [25,26], as well as 
structural form models which select not just the organisation of items but the form of 
that organisation, considering clusters, trees and chains among others [27,28]. This 
provides a substantial level of flexibility in the ultimate representation, but by 
expanding the number of considered forms in this way, such systems require strong 
inductive priors to adequately limit the hypothesis space in order to allow efficient 
learning from limited data. 
Logical Methods 
Logical methods define items or concepts using logical statements concerning the 
features of the target, identifying common elements within a data set that can be 
distilled into grammatical terms for use in future predictions. This is most clearly 
demonstrated in inductive logic programming systems [29], which have been used to 
generate logical rules for classifications [30] and state transitions [31]. 
Similar concepts can be observed in rule-based models of human behaviour, 
commonly used in categorisation as category membership is often defined by similar 
boundaries in everyday life [32,33]; indeed, Feldman suggests that categorisation 
behaviour reflects the use of Boolean logic, with the difficulty in learning a rule being 
proportional to its Boolean complexity [34]. Models such as RULEX [35] therefore 
search through stimulus dimensions to find the simplest rule which maximises 
discriminability, whilst also creating a store of exceptions. Much like the spatial 
methods above, these have more recently been developed into more advanced 
probabilistic grammars (e.g. [36]), allowing for stronger inductive inferences from 
limited data. This can again lead to a rational model of structure discovery, in which a 
rule is inferred from observations using priors on individual components to provide a 
bias toward simplicity, with lower probabilities for more complex, multidimensional 
rules. Rule-based systems are not purely limited to categorisation, however, with 
similar methods being applied to the learning of language [37] and functions [38]. 
Figure 1. Applications of three machine learning methods using different representations to a 
basic exclusive-or classification task using the dimensions of size and shade (examples of 
stimuli in a). This problem can be solved by a spatial clustering method (b), a logical 
Boolean method (c), and an artificial neural network (d). 
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The key advantage of these logical systems is compositionality: individual 
elements can be combined to create much more complex rules from fairly simplistic 
building blocks. In addition, grammars provide a modality-independent 
representation, able to be translated into alternate formats to direct behaviour in tasks 
beyond those used for initial learning [39]. Logical systems do, however, naturally 
draw hard boundaries between categories, making it more difficult to account for the 
graded nature of human category representations [40]. While probabilistic versions of 
these systems do help to account for this issue [36,41], such additional flexibility 
again requires strong inductive priors in order to learn effectively from limited data. 
Recent years have also offered a more advanced form of this representation in 
‘program’ models [42,43], which use Bayesian induction to construct complex 
production procedures from more basic elements. This is suggested to generate broad 
and rich representations from small data samples, allowing for accurate 
generalisations from even a single category member [43] and more intuitive and 
predictable laws in function learning [44]. Programs do, however, present an 
especially complex representational form, and as such are more critically in need of 
adequate biases to match human learning. 
Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks provide an alternate form of representation using 
networks of interconnected nodes, with the strength of the connections being adjusted 
with experience to reproduce external patterns. This representation intuitively 
provides a closer correspondence between method principles and actual 
implementation in the brain: connectionist networks offer a simplified emulation of 
true neural structures, inherently affording such methods a degree of external validity 
[45]. These systems therefore contrast with both spatial and logical models of human 
cognition in their level of explanation; while the above methods focus on Marr’s 
computational level, network methods instead operate at Marr’s implementation level 
[46]. 
Rather than the strict delineations between methods seen in the above branches, 
complexity within these networks increases somewhat gradually according to size, 
both in terms of breadth and depth. This extends from basic mechanisms like 
perceptrons, which essentially provide a connectionist implementation of prototypes 
[1,47], to more complex parallel distributed processing systems, expanding the 
number of nodes and connections to create a more extensive network with a greater 
representational capacity [48]. There are, however, additional complexities in these 
methods beyond network size, with recurrent and convolutional networks being some 
of the more notable forms. In addition, recent neural networks have been further 
expanded to include external memory stores, using these elements to further improve 
their performance [49]. 
Highly complex neural networks have in fact become increasingly common in 
machine learning in recent years due to a surge in the use of deep learning systems in 
various complex tasks; these methods use multiple, hierarchical layers of connections 
for increasing levels of abstraction [50,51]. Such systems have the advantage of 
flexibility, providing a single, global system that can be applied fairly readily to 
multiple fields. Deep learning systems have therefore been successful in finding 
categorical structures in image recognition [52,53] and speech processing [54,55], as 
well as matching or exceeding human performance on complex tasks such as playing 
video and board games [56,57]. 
Within cognitive modelling, simple network models have been commonly used in 
associative learning theories (e.g. [58]), providing an extensive literature using 
networks often limited to only a few nodes representing basic stimulus features. The 
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more complex networks used in deep learning, meanwhile, are still beginning to be 
applied to behaviour [59-61], creating cognitive models that can take advantage of the 
power of such methods. There are, however, concerns whether such applications are 
truly valid: while deep learning systems demonstrate a similar level of performance to 
human learning, and use similar representations to those of actual neural systems 
[62,63], both speed of learning and ease of generalisation are much higher in people 
than machines [43,64], potentially indicating some difference in operation. This is 
further complicated by the opaqueness of such methods, with any generated 
representation being distributed across a potentially enormous series of connection 
weights; this can make interpretation of the learned representation difficult, relying 
more on behavioural predictions than any obvious structure. 
Conclusions 
As the above sections hopefully illustrate, machine learning methods have 
become increasingly common within cognitive science as descriptions of human 
behaviour, providing accurate emulations in various tasks. One question that could 
then be raised when comparing human and machine learning is which of these models 
is most accurate to the human learning system given their differences in 
representation. Such a contrast may not, however, be entirely helpful given that, as 
alluded to by George Box [65], no model provides a perfect description of behaviour, 
instead offering useful explorations of the ways in which human learning operates. As 
such, the value of these methods for cognitive science depends not just on their match 
to human behaviour, but also the suitability of the representation used to the needs 
and aims of the topic at hand; for example, neural networks may be best suited to 
subjects where the representation is less vital than the resulting behaviour, while 
spatial models can be used when this representation is under examination. These 
aspects must therefore be considered alongside evaluations of accuracy when 
selecting research models. 
A more general aspect raised in this comparison is the difference between the 
goals of machine learning and cognitive science, which in turn leads to differences in 
approach: machine learning methods have primarily focused on efficacy, often 
searching for optimal real-world performance; this has led these systems to approach 
increasingly complex real-world tasks over the course of their development, building 
on their previous success in more basic problems. Conversely, cognitive science has 
instead sought to capture human behaviour, whether optimal or not; as such, much of 
the research in this field has involved simplified diagnostic versions of real-world 
tasks, using abstracted stimuli and designs for greater experimental control. 
This contrast may then provide a direction for future cognitive research: while the 
existing approach is certainly highly valuable in defining the operations of human 
cognition, in order to provide more complete models of behaviour, cognitive 
scientists should also attempt to address the complex real-world tasks currently 
targeted by machine learning. Such an expansion can of course take advantage of the 
success of machine learning methods in these tasks, continuing to use these systems 
as a base for more advanced models of behaviour.  
There is, however, another aspect that must be considered when applying these 
methods to human behaviour: the constraints placed upon the system to make 
learning feasible. In the case of machine learning, this relates to the algorithms used 
to define the parameters of the generated representation, determining the learnability 
of the system; for example, the success of the previously noted deep learning systems 
is not simply due to the use of complex networks, but also the advances in algorithms 
which make that representation learnable. 
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This means that any application of these advanced machine learning methods to 
behaviour requires careful consideration of both the generated representation and the 
associated algorithms used to acquire that representation. This is particularly 
important given that this algorithm must account for both the general level of human 
performance as well as any systematic errors made by human learners that would be 
undesirable in artificial agents. There are, however, multiple potential algorithms that 
could be applied to such models to fill this role according to the form of the 
representation; for example, sampling procedures can be used as an approximation for 
a number of Bayesian spatial models [66], while network structures can use 
prediction errors to facilitate learning [67], with both offering potential explanations 
for noted human biases [68-73]. 
We therefore conclude by advising researchers to consider a broad range of both 
representations and algorithms when attempting to model human behaviour, looking 
for the combination of these elements which best captures both the strengths and 
weaknesses of human learning; this will allow cognitive science to take full 
advantage of the power of machine learning methods, and so a greater ability to 
understand how people solve the complex problems found in everyday life. 
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